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Abstract: We suggest that public housing matters for FDI. We assume
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pay compensation in cash. In the paper’s model, however, cash payments are
not successful. But public housing is. – Ultimately we argue that (1) public
housing makes FDI more palatable where (2) cash transfers fail, so that
(3) local government may choose to invest into public housing to overcome
opposition against FDI.
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1This paper was written as part of a CEPR research network on Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and the Multinational Organization, funded by the European Commission under
contract number ERBFMRXCT980215. I am grateful for stimulating comments by Frank
Barry, Frank B¨ onker, and Hermann Ribhegge.”Hong Kong and Singapore intervened heavily in housing markets
to win the support and cooperation of non-elites. By providing
low cost housing for the majority of residents, both programs have
helped to decrease inequality and minimize social unrest, thus
providing the long-term stability attractive to investors.”(World
Bank (1993, p. 163))
1. Introduction
According to the World Bank, large local public housing and high urban
growth are no coincidence. Rather, public housing is seen as a successful
instrument to stimulate growth. But, of course, why did Hong Kong and
Singapore choose public housing, rather than a simple cash transfer, to win
support? – In this paper we suggest an explanation of how public housing
matters, and how cash transfers do not matter, to inward FDI and hence to
growth. Here is a two-step outline of the argument:
FDI is like many other reforms. In our model, FDI creates gains for all
residents; it imposes losses on some residents; and it does not aﬀect non-
residents. Gains from FDI occur as the urban wage rises. Losses from FDI
arise from a negative technological externality. – Losers from FDI opppose
FDI. To overcome opposition, local government may set up a cash transfer
compensation scheme. In our model, however, access to that scheme cannot
be restricted to losers from FDI. In our model, in fact, access cannot even be
restricted to residents. Non-residents must be eligible, too. Then any cash
transfer will merely attract non-residents who drive up rent.
Public housing is unlike many other transfers. In our model public housing,
like cash transfers, cannot be restricted to losers from FDI. But in our model
public housing, unlike cash transfers, can be restricted to residents. More-
over, by building up public housing local government shifts property rights
from landlords to public housing tenants. Public housing tenants pay ﬁxed
rent. Hence they are sheltered from rent rises following FDI-induced wage
rises. Residents who lose from FDI if they are private sector renters may
actually beneﬁt from, and hence approve of, FDI if they are public housing
tenants. In short, public housing may favorably aﬀect residents’ attitudes
towards FDI in a way that cash transfers may not. Then local government
should provide public housing, not cash transfers, if it is to win approval of
FDI.
The paper is an attempt to contribute to the literature in two ways. First,
many explanations of FDI focus on diﬀerent locations’ relative attractiveness
1to foreign investors. These explanations discuss ”demand for locations”, or,
”supply of FDI”, as in Mody/Srinivasan (1998). In this paper, in contrast,
FDI is explained by whether or not a given location is actually intent on
hosting FDI. This, instead, is a theory of ”demand for FDI”, or, ”supply of
location”. In that respect our paper is similar to Janeba (2001). In order
to focus on demand for FDI, we will largely neglect the issue of FDI supply.
FDI supply simply is ”there” or it is ”not there”. Brieﬂy, by oﬀering an
explanation of why local public housing might matter to FDI, we suggest yet
another ”demand side”, and to our knowledge novel, determinant of inward
FDI.
Second, public housing is advocated, and condemned, on numerous grounds.
For example, according to Rosen (1985), public housing is popular among pa-
ternalistic policy makers who want to enforce minimum housing consumption
among public housing tenants. However, public housing also is more costly
than an equivalent cash transfer, i.e., the cash transfer that would grant
those not in public housing the level of utility that public housing grants to
those in public housing (e.g., see Aaron/Furstenberg (1971), Murray (1975),
Olsen/Barton (1983), or Wong/Lui (1988)). Brieﬂy, by oﬀering an explana-
tion of why local public housing may matter to FDI – while cash transfers
may not –, we suggest yet another, and to our knowledge novel, distinction
between public housing and cash transfers.
We emphasize our focus on the small city’s openness to migration. While
ultimately we are interested in explaining FDI at the country level, at ﬁrst
we are interested in explaining FDI at the city level. FDI is not evenly
spread over a country’s cities. Rather, as stressed by Guimaraes/Figueiredo/
Woodward (2000), foreign investors are, much as domestic investors, looking
out for the economies at the heart of the new economic geography. These
economies are oﬀered by some cities but not by others. Then FDI upsets
the initial regional equilibrium. By triggering migration and changes in rent,
FDI produces redistribution from renters to landlords. This redistribution
is important because it aﬀects landlords’ incentives to attract, and renters’
incentives to host, FDI. This redistribution, however, could be overlooked if
FDI is solely analzyed at the national, rather than the city, level.
That redistribution triggered by migration is important is a central lesson
from the literature on local redistribution. In our model local government
cannot tell native residents who lose from native residents who do not lose.
Any local compensation scheme must encompass more than just precisely
those who lose from FDI. Local government may try to restrict the scheme
to native residents. However, ”compensating” native residents who have not
2lost from FDI while not ”compensating” immigrant residents – who have
not lost from FDI either – would be discrimination against immigrant resi-
dents. But discrimination against immigrant residents is not possible. This,
at least, is the premise underlying much of the literature on local redistri-
bution, see Wildasin (1991) and Cr´ emer (1996).2 Then local compensation
runs into the same diﬃculty as local redistribution. With perfect household
mobility and without discrimination against non-residents, local compensa-
tion attracts immigrant residents who simply drive up rent until the beneﬁt
from the ”compensation scheme” is completely oﬀset.
Note that we do not suggest any link between public housing and domes-
tic direct investment. Domestic direct investment, so we suppose, imposes
smaller losses on, and hence meets less resistance from, residents than FDI.
This may be justiﬁed by pointing, in an ad-hoc fashion, to residents’ fear of
foreign inﬂuence on local decision making. But this may also be justiﬁed by
pointing to the empirical evidence in Figlio/Blonigen (2000) that FDI indeed
has a stronger inﬂuence on local decision making than domestic direct invest-
ment. When comparing FDI with domestic direct investment in a panel of
North Carolina counties, Figlio/Blonigen ﬁnd that FDI translates into larger
reductions in local public spending on residents’ (children’s) education than
does domestic direct investment.
In what follows, we will set up a two-period model. The ﬁrst period represents
the world before the advent of FDI. No foreign investor applies for permission
to set up production in the small open city under consideration. The second
period represents a world in which FDI becomes possible: Now a foreign
investor may, or may not, present himself to the city and apply for permission.
Whether or not FDI takes place, then, depends on the city’s willingness
to grant permission and provide the necessary infrastructure. There is a
”r´ egime change” from period 1 to period 2. Importantly, we assume that
local government in period 1 is aware of the r´ egime change.
We will show that local government may ﬁnd it attractive to invest into public
housing in the ﬁrst period even though public housing oﬀers no beneﬁt then.
This is because, with residents safe in public housing, local government can
be sure to meet approval of FDI in period 2 in the event a foreign investor
applies. The resulting - uncertain - second period gain to local government,
of course, must be suﬃciently large to oﬀset the - certain - ﬁrst and second
period cost of public housing. This, then, is the model’s strategic public
housing, as in the paper’s title.
2There are few papers modeling, let alone recommending, discrimination against non-
residents. Sandmo/Wildasin (1999) and Sinn (2002) are two of the exceptions.
3Alternatively, of course, we could have assumed that local government is
completely surprised by the r´ egime change. Then local government would
not undertake any strategic public housing. But the paper’s model would
still predict that public housing, installed for other reasons than its potential
to win approval of FDI, helps to win approval of FDI. – In section 2 we
set out the model’s assumptions. Section 3 describes a game between local
government and an interest group that represents the interests of losers from
FDI. Section 4 collects two case studies from Hong Kong and Singapore.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model’s Assumptions
2.1 Households
Consider a federation made up of many small open cities. We focus on one
of these cities, say, city i. In what follows we drop the city index i, because
all variables, unless explicitly noted, refer to i. There are three goods: a
consumption good x, housing y, and a local public good G. The price of the
tradable consumption good is throughout the same and set equal to 1. The
price of housing, or, rent, is q.
There are two broad classes of households in the model: Landlords and
renters. Landlords own the city’s housing stock T but are absentee. Land-
lords will be important because of their inﬂuence on local government. How-
ever, being absentee, landlords will not be relevant to local labor supply and
local housing demand. Rather, it is renters’ housing demand and labor sup-
ply that matter to housing and labor market equilibrium. A renter’s only
endowment is labor which he inelastically supplies to the city’s ﬁrms, earning
w in return.3
Renters diﬀer by origin and by preferences: Renters are either natives to i
or immigrants into i. (If they are immigrants into i, they must be natives to
some other city j, (j 6= i).) Natives either derive beneﬁt from G, the local
public good in i – or they do not. Natives to i who beneﬁt from G we call
A’s; natives to i who do not beneﬁt from G we call B’s. Altogether there are
A A’s and B B’s native to i, giving a total of N = A+B natives to i. Next,
immigrants subdivide into immigrant A’s and immigrant B’s. Immigrant A’s
appreciate the local public good in the city they come from while immigrant
B’s do not. Nevertheless, neither type appreciates G, the local public good
in i. To capture the diﬀerent constellations we deﬁne an indicator Ik
j :





1 if j = i and k = A
0 otherwise (1)
where k, (k = A;B), is the household’s type and where j is the city a
household is native to.4 Then we assume that a household of type k, native




A’s or immigrant A’s completely forego the beneﬁt from the local public good
when leaving the city they are native to. Hence G captures A-households’
”home attachment”, i.e., their attachment to the city they are native to.5 In
contrast, B’s and immigrant B’s are not attached at all.
We assume that all households are perfectly mobile across space. But we also
assume that the beneﬁt from the local public good is ”suﬃciently large”that
A’s always prefer to stay in the city they are native, and attached, to. It is
merely B’s – who are not attached to any particular city – that only ever
consider leaving their home town. The implication is that there cannot be
immigrant A’s in i - only immigrant B’s. The stock of immigrant B’s resident
in i we denote by ¯ B. The total number of i’s residents is N + ¯ B.
Clearly A’s are always better oﬀ than B’s. A’s appreciate being attached to
i. However, A’s are also more vulnerable than B’s. This is because below we
will assume that FDI adversely aﬀects the quality of the local public good.
FDI generates a negative externality that reduces G.
2.2 Local Government
We index periods by superscript t, (t = 1;2), where variables not indexed
are constant over time.6 Local government is run by landlords. In the local
public ﬁnance literature this is justiﬁed by assuming that all households are
perfectly mobile (e.g., see Wildasin (1987)). In spatial equilibrium, then,
utility is everywhere the same. Whatever local government does, mobile
households do not bear any of the consequences. Only landlords do. Hence
really only landlords should care about local government’s decisions.
4Note that i is the ﬁxed city we focus on while j could be any city, including i.
5The term ”home attachment” we borrow from Mansoorian/Myers (1997)
6Confusion with squares will not be possible. There are no squares in the paper.
5However, by introducing home attachment in this paper, A’s no longer have
the same utility everywhere even though they are still assumed to be perfectly
mobile. We must expect landlords and A’s to struggle over who controls local
government. In what follows we continue to assume that it is landlords who
seize control over local government. However, A’s are represented in local
politics, too (by an interest group, see below).
In order to appease A’s in the event that FDI takes place and A’s get hurt,
local government may want to oﬀer cash. Only, local government cannot
identify who native A’s are. Nor can native A’s credibly make themselves
heard. Native A’s are too similar to native B’s. Not being able to identify
the true losers from FDI is local government’s informational constraint. Its
implication is that any transfer designed to beneﬁt native A’s must also
beneﬁt native B’s. In principle, this is a well-known fundamental dilemma
of any compensation scheme (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)).
Next, if native B’s are eligible then immigrant B’s must be eligible, too.
After all, both types of B’s exhibit identical endowments and preferences.
A transfer oﬀered to native B’s though denied to immigrant B’s would be
discrimination. But extending a transfer designed to compensate native A’s
to immigrant B’s deﬁes the purpose of the transfer. Under the small open
city assumption, immigrant B’s will merely drive up rent until the transfer
is completely capitalized into higher rent. This is a well-known fundamental
dilemma of any transfer scheme in the presence of household mobility, as
analyzed by a large literature on the feasibility of local redistribution (sur-
veyed by, e.g., Cr´ emer et al. (1997)). We follow this literature in assuming
that discrimination is not possible. This is local government’s institutional
constraint.
Public housing oﬀers a way out of this, for two reasons. First, to attract
households public housing needs to be more attractive than private sector
housing. Then there must be rationing, or, waiting lists in order to allocate
public housing ﬂats. But waiting lists clearly favor natives over immigrants.
Natives become informed of, apply for, and get access to public housing much
earlier than immigrants simply because they have been there ”ﬁrst”. More-
over, and second, proving discrimination against immigrants under public
housing becomes more diﬃcult. Now it is not just new-arrivals who do not
get to beneﬁt from public housing. There are households who arrived earlier
who have not yet succeeded in moving into public housing, either.
In principle we could cast our distinction between cash transfers and pub-
lic housing in terms of diﬀerences in the ”political costs” of discrimination.
6Discrimination using cash transfers is highly visible and, hence, must involve
large political costs. Discrimination using public housing is more subtle and
less visible and, hence, involves smaller costs. In this paper, we simply argue
that discrimination using cash transfers is not feasible while discrimination
as regards public housing is.
That political costs of discrimination are lower with public housing than with
cash transfers may also be inferred from looking at the empirical evidence.
On the one hand, there is evidence that access to public housing is com-
monly restricted to natives. Painter (1997), for instance, notes that housing
authorities in the US exhibit ”local preference”. Housing authorities prefer
households living within their respective jurisdictions over households moving
in from elsewhere.7 On the other hand, US states no longer impose residence
requirements when deciding on a household’s eligibility for a cash transfer.
In what follows, public housing will only be granted to a fraction ¹, ¹ 2 f0;1g,
of native residents, i.e., to ¹N households. Hence we assume that either all
natives, or no native, will get to live in public housing.8 The lump sum
cash transfer ¾t, (¾t ¸ 0), in contrast, is given to all residents not in public
housing, i.e., to [(1 ¡ ¹)N + ¯ Bt] households. Landlords’ aggregate housing
endowment is T. Aggregate rent income is Tqt.
The cost of providing public housing is ¹Nˆ y(qt ¡ ˆ q). Here ˆ q is the ﬁxed rent
under public housing where, of course, ˆ q < qt. Also, ˆ y is ﬂat size under public
housing. Aggregate local cash transfers are ¾t[(1 ¡ ¹)N + ¯ Bt]. Finally, local
government may decide to invest into a pure public input °t, later referred to
as ”eﬀort towards FDI”. The costs of ”FDI eﬀort” are given by K(°t), with
K(0) = 0 and K° > 0.
Then in t local government’s (landlords’) net revenue is
R
t ´ Tq
t ¡ ¹Nˆ y(q
t ¡ ˆ q) ¡ ¾




Household consumption takes place in two diﬀerent periods. For simplicity,
however, we assume that households are myopic. Households do not save.
7Also, the case studies on Hong Kong and Singapore in section 4 give examples of
public housing being restricted to natives.
8For reasons explained below, this case is simpler to analyze than when ¹ is allowed to
take on any value between zero and 1.
7Households are either private sector renters or public housing tenants. First
we turn to maximum utility of private sector renters. Whether immigrant
or native, or whether A or B, any private sector renter maximizes u(xt;yt)
subject to the budget constraint wt +¾t = xt +qtyt.9 This gives Marshallian
demands ˜ xt = x(qt;wt +¾t) and ˜ yt = y(qt;wt +¾t). A private sector renter’s





t) ´ u(˜ x
t; ˜ y
t) (4)
or, shorter, ˜ vt. Using (1), a k-household native to j has maximum utility
˜ vt + Ik
j G as private sector renter, where k = A;B and where j can be any
city. Using Roy’s theorem we have: (¡˜ vt
q=˜ vt
w) = ˜ yt.10
Next we turn to maximum utility of public housing tenants. A native allo-
cated to public housing gets to live in a ﬂat of size ˆ y at rent ˆ q. Because a
tenant is not entitled to the local cash transfer, from his budget constraint
we have: ˆ xt = wt ¡ ˆ qˆ y: The maximum utility that a public housing tenant
derives from consuming the consumption good and public housing is
ˆ v(ˆ q; ˆ y;w
t) ´ u(ˆ x
t; ˆ y
t) (5)
or, shorter, ˆ vt. Then a native k-household’s maximum utility as public hous-
ing tenant is ˆ vt + Ik
i G.
Parameters ˆ y and ˆ q are determined outside the model. But of course they
must be such that utility as public housing tenant is always higher than
utility as private sector renter. So we assume that ˆ vt > ˜ vt.
2.4 Beneﬁts and Costs of FDI
Beneﬁts from FDI occur as wages wt rise in the event of FDI. We do not ex-
plicitly model the underlying production sector. Instead we simply stipulate
the following link between FDI and the urban wage:
w
t = w + ±
t°
t (6)
9With Gt exogenous, u(xt;yt) not just is B-households’ utility function. It also is a
monotonous transformation of A-households’ utility function.
10Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
8Here w > 0 is the wage in the absence of FDI; °t, with °t ¸ 0, is local gov-
ernment’s - costly - eﬀort to please foreign investors (”FDI eﬀort”). Whether
increasing FDI eﬀort translates into a higher wage depends on the value of the
random variable ±t, ±t 2 f0;1g. If ±t = 1, with probability p, (0 < p < 1), a
foreign investor applies to invest in city i (”FDI application”). If ±t = 0, with
probability (1 ¡ p), no foreign investor applies.11 From local government’s
perspective, only FDI eﬀort °t is endogenous; w as well as ±t are exogenous.
Now, if either no foreign investor applies (±t = 0), or local government does
not attempt to please foreign investors (°t = 0), or both, then there will be
no FDI, and, hence, no change in the urban wage. For FDI to take place
there must be a joint eﬀort by local government and the foreign investor. For





Since the model’s two periods are meant to capture the world before and
after the advent of FDI, we assume that ±1 = 0. No foreign investor will
apply in period 1: (dw1=d°1) = ±1 = 0. FDI can only ever be an issue in
period 2. Then (dw2=d°2) = ±2 ¸ 0.
Next we turn to the costs of FDI. We assume that FDI generates an exter-





where (Gt)0 < 0.12 Since ±1 = 0, home attachment in period 1 is G1 =
G(0) > 0. Note that home attachment would not deteriorate simply because
an investor applies (± = 1), or because local government is making an eﬀort
to attract FDI (° ¸ 0). Rather, it takes both to actually make A’s worse oﬀ.
2.5 Equilibrium
In initial spatial equilibrium, so we assume, there are immigrant B’s living in
i, but no native B’s not living in i. Also we assume that in initial spatial
equilibrium not all B’s native to other cities are living in i. Then spatial
equilibrium requires that in both periods utility for B’s in i is the same as
utility elsewhere ¯ v:





t) = ¯ v (9)
Market equilibrium requires that the regional housing market clear in both
periods. Total available housing is T. Demand for public housing is ¹Nˆ y
and demand for private sector housing is [(1¡¹)N + ¯ Bt]˜ yt. Housing market
equilibrium is where
T = ¹Nˆ y +
h






Equations (6), (9) and (10) determine wt, qt and ¯ Bt. Using (7), totally








Hence (dq1=d°1) = 0 whereas (dq2=d°2) ¸ 0. Next, (dq1=d¾1);(dq2=d¾2) > 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating (10), and rearranging, gives:



















w˜ yt + ˜ yt
q) is the derivative of a private sector renter’s Hicksian de-
mand for housing with respect to rent - which must be negative. Then,
for later use, we may note that (d ¯ B1=d°1) = 0, (d ¯ B2=d°2) ¸ 0 while
(d ¯ B1=d¾1);(d ¯ B2=d¾2) > 0.
3. Public Housing and the Political Economy of FDI
Individual households do not act strategically. This we justify by pointing to
two elements of the model. First, some households are completely mobile: B’s
always have utility ¯ v, thanks to not being attached to any city in particular.
For B’s there simply is no need to look ahead. Second, we assume that those
households whose utilities vary with the local equilibrium are represented
by two players that actively pursue these households’ respective interests.
We assume that local government, as one player, acts on landlords’ behalf;
10and that an interest group, as the other player and described in more detail
below, acts on behalf of vulnerable A’s.13 Local government and the interest
group play a game that ultimately determines the level of inward FDI and
the extent of local public housing.
The game consists of four stages. Stages 1 and 2 belong to the ﬁrst period
(”no foreign investor applies”); stages 3 and 4 to the second period (”a foreign
investor may apply”).
3.1 The Timing of Events
First stage: At the beginning of the ﬁrst period local government decides on
¹, °1, and ¾1, while taking into account that ±1 = 0. There are two important
restrictions on the choice of ¹. First, local government’s choice is limited to
¹ 2 f0;1g. And second, local government’s choice is ”clay”; once ¹ is chosen
it is ﬁxed for the remainder of the game. Hence in both periods there are
¹N natives in public housing as well as (1¡¹)N natives living in the private
rented sector. – Local government’s choice of ° and ¾ is ”putty”. In period
2 local government may decide to revise °1 and ¾1 by choosing °2 and ¾2
instead.
For ±1 = 0 and for chosen °1 and ¾1, the urban wage is w1 = w via (6).
Local rent q1 is implicitly deﬁned by ˜ v(q1;w1+¾1) = ¯ v in (9). A-households’
attachment to home is G1 as deﬁned by (8). A native A’s maximum utility
in the private rented sector is ¯ v + G1 while a native A’s maximum utility as
public housing tenant is ˆ v1 + G1. A native B as public housing tenant has
indirect utility ˆ v1.
Second stage: At the end of the ﬁrst period a local interest group emerges.
Its formation reﬂects the fact that A’s in i have higher utility than what is
necessary to induce them to stay in i. In other words, A’s enjoy a quasi-
rent. G alternatively may be referred to as the level of the local public good,
A-households’ home attachment, or A-households’ quasi-rent. A’s must be
afraid of losing part, or even all, of this quasi-rent in the second period
if FDI occurs. So the quasi-rent calls for protection. The interest group’s
raison d’ˆ etre is to deliver this protection. We assume that the interest group’s
welfare equals the sum of all interest group members’ utilities. Making use
of the deﬁnitions of indirect utility and of the spatial equilibrium condition
(9), interest group welfare in t, At, is
13We assume away the pitfalls of collective action. Local government represents all
landlords; the interest group represents all native A’s.
11A
t ´ AG
t + ¹Aˆ v
t + (1 ¡ ¹)A¯ v (13)
The interest group has no inﬂuence on policy decisions in period 1 since
period 1 is ending at the moment of the interest group’s formation. But the
interest group matters to policy in period 2. We assume that the interest
group may require local government to keep interest group welfare in the
second period A2, at, or above, the value ˆ A, where, however, this chosen
value ˆ A must not exceed interest group welfare in period 1, A1:
ˆ A 2 [0;A
1] (14)
By choosing ˆ A = A1, for example, the interest group could force local gov-
ernment to restrict its subsequent choice of °2 and ¾2 to values that actually
improve upon, or to the very least maintain, current interest group welfare
A1.14
Third stage: At the beginning of the second period nature moves. In the
previous period ±1 = 0. Now, with probability p, (0 < p < 1), ±2 = 1;
with probability (1 ¡ p), ±2 = 0. The parameter p is meant to reﬂect ”all
other determinants” of FDI other than this paper’s conﬂict between local
government and the interest group.
Fourth stage: Local government may revise its previous choices of ”putty”
variables, but given the interest group’s and nature’s previous moves. In
particular, when choosing °2 and ¾2 local government must observe A2 ¸ ˆ A.
For given ±2 and °2, the regional wage becomes w2 = w + ±2°2 via (6). A
native A’s home attachment becomes G2 as deﬁned by (8). A native A’s
maximum utility in the private rented sector is ¯ v + G2 while a native A’s
maximum utility as public housing tenant now is ˆ v2 + G2. Finally, a native
B as public housing tenant has indirect utility ˆ v2. - Figure 1 summarizes the
timing of events.
14In period 2 all that may ever happen is a positive shock. Then assuming that the
interest group is indeed capable of enforcing the status quo via (14) should not be too
restrictive.
















Fourth stage: At the ﬁnal stage local government maximizes R2, as deﬁned
in (3), given its own decisions at the ﬁrst stage, given the interest group’s
choice of A2 at the second stage, and given ±2 as determined at the third
stage. Speciﬁcally, local government needs to solve
max
°2;¾2 Tq
2 ¡ ¹Nˆ y(q
2 ¡ ˆ q) ¡ ¾




2 ¸ 0 ; ¾
2 ¸ 0 ; ¡ ˆ A + AG
2 + ¹Aˆ v
2 + (1 ¡ ¹)A¯ v ¸ 0
Written out in full, ﬁrst order conditions are
















2 ¸ 0 (16)
with respect to °2,
(T ¡ ¹Nˆ y)
dq2
d¾2 ¡ [(1 ¡ ¹)N + ¯ B
2] ¡ ¾
2d ¯ B2
d¾2 · 0 (17)
¾
2 ¸ 0 (18)
with respect to ¾2, and
¡ ˆ A + AG
2 + ¹Aˆ v
2 + (1 ¡ ¹)A¯ v ¸ 0 (19)
¸ ¸ 0 (20)
13with respect to ¸, where ¸ is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with the
interest group constraint. Also, it is understood that conditions (15) and
(16), conditions (17) and (18), as well as conditions (19) and (20) cannot be
slack at the same time. Jointly, then, necessary conditions (15) through (20)
determine °2, ¾2, and ¸.
Early on we are able to show that ¾2 must be zero. First, because of (11),
we can replace dq2=d¾2 on the l.h.s. of (17) with (1=˜ y2). Next, also using
housing market equilibrium condition (10), we see that the l.h.s. of (17)
reduces to (¡¾2)(d ¯ B2=d¾2). The latter expression is strictly negative as long
as ¾2 is larger than zero. By complementary slackness, ¾2 must be zero. In
period 2, the optimal level of local government cash transfers to households
in the private rented sector is zero.
This is the result of the local government’s informational and institutional
constraints discussed above. Their joint eﬀect is to force local government to
extend any cash transfer scheme designed to compensate residents hurt by
FDI to non-residents not hurt. In response, non-residents will immigrate to
become eligible for ”compensation” and drive up rents. They thereby oﬀset
any net income gain initiated by the cash transfer.
Third stage: As explained above, at the third stage nature determines whether
a foreign investor applies to invest (± = 1) or not (± = 0). Second stage: At
the second stage the interest group decides on ˆ A 2 [0;A1]. Clearly, the in-
terest group will never choose ˆ A < A1. To show this we address what could
happen if it did. For example, assume that ˆ A · A2 · A1 in the event that
± = 1 and A1 < A2 in the event that ± = 0. Then in the event that ± = 1 the
interest group is worse oﬀ than it would be had it chosen ˆ A = A1. Further-
more, in the event that ± = 0 the interest group is never better oﬀ than it
would be had it chosen ˆ A = A1. After all, imposing the non-binding restric-
tion ˆ A = A1 instead of ˆ A < A1 would not have prevented the interest group
from attaining A2 > A1, also. The interest group should choose ˆ A = A1.
The same result applies to the three other cases to be considered, too. Since
the reasoning is very similar, we omit these. We conclude that, whatever
nature’s move, and in anticipation of local government behavior at the ﬁnal
stage, the interest group’s optimal choice always is ˆ A = A1. Put diﬀerently,
the interest group will never demand anything less than the status quo. No
concessions will be made.
In what follows we drop (17) and (18), and simplify (15), by making use of
¾2 = 0. In (15), we substitute (±2=˜ y2) for (dq2=d°2) by using (11). Also we
14make use of (dG2=d°2) = (G2)0±2, via diﬀerentiating (8). In inequality (19)
we replace ˆ A by A1 = AG1 + ¹Aˆ v1 + (1 ¡ ¹)A¯ v. Finally we drop (1 ¡ ¹)A¯ v
from both sides of (19). Instead of (15) through (20) we now have (again we
omit the corresponding conditions of complementary slackness):















2 ¸ 0 (22)
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2 + ¹ˆ v
2 ¸ G
1 + ¹ˆ v
1 (23)
¸ ¸ 0 (24)
For later use we deﬁne (T ¡ ¹Nˆ y)(±2=˜ y2) ¡ (dK=d°2) as FDI eﬀort’s net
marginal beneﬁt. – Conditions (21) through (24) are helpful in assessing °2.
We look at the four scenarios that result from combining whether an investor
applies or not with whether natives live in public housing or not.
Case I: ±2 = 0 and ¹ = 0. First, by (23), any °2 will satisfy the interest
group constraint. Because there is no foreign investor, and hence no FDI, no
level of °2 can be detrimental to A’s. However, the l.h.s. of (21) reduces to
¡(dK=d°2). Hence by complementary slackness we must have °2 = 0. Put
diﬀerently, while natives would not be protected from FDI-induced rent rises
this lack of protection, of course, is irrelevant since no foreign investor ever
applies.
Case II: ±2 = 0 and ¹ = 1. Again, by (23), any °2 will satisfy the interest
group constraint. And the l.h.s. of (21) again reduces to ¡(dK=d°2). By
complementary slackness we must have °2 = 0. Economically speaking,
public housing would shield all natives from any rise in rent. Nevertheless,
given that no foreign investor applies local government will not want to invest
into FDI eﬀort, and hence will not need the interest group’s approval, anyway.
Case III: ±2 = 1 and ¹ = 0. First, by (23), only °2 with °2 · 0 can satisfy
the interest group constraint. This is because here the constraint becomes
G1 · G2 which, by G0 < 0, implies °1±1 ¸ °2±2 , 0 ¸ °2. But by (22)
°2 ¸ 0. Hence °2 = 0. In eﬀect, the constraint only allows to ”choose” from
a set with one element. On the l.h.s. of (21) net marginal beneﬁt becomes
15(T=˜ y2) ¡ (dK=d°2). Since °2 must be zero we need to distinguish between
two subcases. Either net marginal beneﬁt is negative. Then local government
not just is not allowed to, but also does not want to, invest into FDI eﬀort.
Or, net marginal beneﬁt is positive. This is the more interesting subcase.
Then local government is not able to, while it does want to, invest into FDI
eﬀort. Economically speaking, even though a foreign investor applies local
government cannot take advantage of it. For lack of an eﬀective instrument
of compensation, local government must turn away the foreign investor.
Case IV: ±2 = 1 and ¹ = 1. This is the only case where we cannot rule out
°2 > 0; °2 > 0 may be consistent with (21) to (24). First note that the
interest group constraint (23) may also be satisﬁed for °2 > 0. The reason is
that FDI in combination with public housing increases tenants’ wages without
increasing tenants’ rents. If the increase in real income ˆ v2 ¡ ˆ v1 exceeded, or
equaled, the reduction in quasi-rent G1 ¡G2, then the l.h.s. of (23) could be
greater than, or equal to, the r.h.s. of (23). In this situation A’s, even though
°2 > 0, would approve of local government’s FDI eﬀort. – By complementary
slackness, having °2 > 0 requires that (21) be satisﬁed with equality. If (21)
is satisﬁed with equality, then °2 > 0 indeed is a solution to conditions (21)
through (24).
We will assume that this is the case. So in the presence of a foreign investor
and of local public housing, investment into FDI eﬀort makes local govern-
ment better oﬀ while it does not make the interest group (or B’s) worse oﬀ.
Brieﬂy, local government wants to host FDI, and the interest group wants
to, too. From the city’s perspective, hosting FDI is a Pareto-improvement in
comparison to not hosting FDI.
We emphasize the importance of public housing for allowing FDI to happen.
In our setup, public housing is not just one instrument that permits over-
coming interest group resistance by sharing the beneﬁts of FDI; rather, in
our setup public housing is the only instrument that permits this. Following
FDI, natives’ wage will grow beyond w. In case III, this triggered immigra-
tion and a rise in rent. In case IV this still triggers immmigration. However,
now natives are sheltered from rising rent. Not just is ˆ q smaller than q. Also,
ˆ q is ﬁxed.
Using our previous results on °2, we can derive period 2 net revenue R2
in each of all four cases. Note that since government decisions are largely
similar, the model’s period 2 variables can actually only take on two diﬀerent
sets of values. Either °2 = 0 (cases I, II, and III). Then we will write this
FDI eﬀort and the resulting wage and rent in period 2 as °2 = °±(= 0),
16w2 = w±(= w) via (6), and q2 = q± via (9), respectively. Or, °2 > 0 (case IV).
Then we will write FDI eﬀort and the resulting wage and rent in period 2 as
°2 = °²(> °±), w2 = w²(> w±) and q2 = q²(> q±), respectively. Substituting
these deﬁnitions into (3) gives net revenues for the four cases above as
R
2
I = Tq± if ±
2 = 0; ¹ = 0 (25)
R
2
II = (T ¡ Nˆ y)q± + Nˆ yˆ q if ±
2 = 0; ¹ = 1 (26)
R
2
III = Tq± if ±
2 = 1; ¹ = 0 (27)
R
2
IV = (T ¡ Nˆ y)q² + Nˆ yˆ q ¡ K(°²) if ±
2 = 1; ¹ = 1 (28)
where subscripts I;II, etc. indicate the corresponding case. We have R2
I =
R2
III because, irrespective of whether or not an investor applies, no FDI will
take place if natives are not protected through public housing, and because
in both cases there are no costs from public housing. Next, R2
II < R2
I. If
no investor turns up, having invested in public housing is worse than not
having invested. Finally, R2
II < R2
IV . Given investment into public housing,
local government would always have the option of keeping FDI eﬀort at °±
if a foreign investor applies. Not having done so by choosing °² > °± shows,
by revealed preference, that net revenue must be larger if FDI eﬀort, and,
hence, FDI, is positive than if FDI eﬀort, and, hence, FDI, is zero.
Comparing R2
I with R2
IV is not as straightforward. On the one hand, local
government earns a higher rent in case IV than in case I: q² > q±. On the
other hand, then there is less land to earn rent from: T ¡ Nˆ y < T. And
there also is the extra cost of FDI eﬀort: K(°²) > 0.





I if ¹ = 0
pR2
IV + (1 ¡ p)R2
II if ¹ = 1 (29)
As will be seen below, investing into public housing in period 1 only generates
extra costs, but no beneﬁt, in period 1. Since having invested into public
housing causes extra period 2 losses in the event that no foreign investor
applies (R2
II < R2
I), at least we must have that having invested into public
housing causes an extra period 2 beneﬁt in the event that a foreign investor
does apply. Hence we assume that R2
IV > R2
I. This could be interpreted
as an assumption on the size of the wage gain (w² ¡ w±) generated by, and
17on the size of eﬀort costs K(°²) involved in, FDI. The wage gain should be
large; eﬀort costs should be small. Clearly, urban economies with ”small”
wage gains in the event of FDI and ”large” eﬀort costs will never invest into
public housing.
First stage: At the ﬁrst stage local government maximizes net revenue R,
i.e., the sum of net revenue in period 1 R1 and expected net revenue in period







1 ¸ 0; ¾
1 ¸ 0; ¹ 2 f0;1g (30)
Note that only public housing ¹, but neither period 1’s FDI eﬀort °1 nor
period 1’s cash transfer ¾1 enter (21) through (24). Hence, of local govern-
ment’s three ﬁrst period/ﬁrst stage decision variables °1, ¾1 and ¹, it is only
¹ that can ever aﬀect °2 and, hence, ER2. Two sets of necessary conditions
are (where we employ the deﬁnition of R1 from (3))






d°1 · 0 (31)
°
1 ¸ 0 (32)
with respect to °1, and
(T ¡ ¹Nˆ y)
dq1
d¾1 ¡ [(1 ¡ ¹)N + ¯ B
1] ¡ ¾
1d ¯ B1
d¾1 · 0 (33)
¾
1 ¸ 0 (34)
with respect to ¾1.
15We ignore the interest rate for simplicity. Including the interest rate does not add
anything substantial except the obvious insight that a larger interest rate leads to stronger
discounting of future revenues and, hence, to a stronger emphasis on ﬁrst period losses
from public housing.
16We restrict local government’s choice of ¹ to either zero or one. This is because without
additional assumptions we cannot be sure about the behavior of the value function R2 as
¹ varies between zero and one.
18Because of (10), the l.h.s. of (33) reduces to (¡¾1)(d ¯ B1=d¾1)) < 0. Hence
¾1 = 0 by complementary slackness. Next, since ±1 = 0 by assumption,
(dq1=d°1) = 0. Then the l.h.s. of (31) reduces to (¡dK=d°1). Hence, °1 = 0
by complementary slackness, or, put diﬀerently, °1 = °±. Next, inserting
±1 = 0 and °1 = 0 into the wage equation (6) gives w1 = w = w±. Inserting
w1 = w± and ¾1 = 0 into the spatial equilibrium condition (9) shows that:





I if ¹ = 0
R2
II if ¹ = 1 (35)
From (35) we see that public housing never pays in period 1. From (29) we









II) if ¹ = 1 (36)
Local government bases its choice of ¹ 2 f0;1g on (36). Rewriting (36) by
using deﬁnitions (25), (26), and (28) gives the model’s central condition: At
the beginning of period 1 local government will invest into public housing iﬀ
p[(T ¡ Nˆ y)(q² ¡ q±) ¡ K(°²)] > 2Nˆ y(q± ¡ ˆ q) (37)
First, choosing ¹ = 1 is more likely the larger is p, i.e., the more attractive
a city is to foreign investors in all respects other than the conﬂict between
landlords and A’s modeled in this paper. Second, choosing ¹ = 1 is more
likely the larger is T or the smaller is Nˆ y, i.e., the larger is housing occupied
by immigrant B’s in initial equilibrium. FDI-induced wage rises for immi-
grant B’s simply translate into rising revenue for landlords without spoiling
anybody’s quasirent. Local government will ﬁnd it more attractive to protect
natives through public housing if natives are a smaller fraction of total city
population. Third, choosing ¹ = 1 is more likely the larger is the rent gain
from FDI, i.e., (q²¡q±), and the lower are the costs of FDI eﬀort, i.e., K(°²).
And fourth, choosing ¹ = 1 is more likely, the less generous is public housing,
i.e., the smaller is (q± ¡ ˆ q).
194. Two Case Studies
In the quote given in the introduction, the World Bank is not explicit on
why public housing was so strongly preferred over other types of transfers.
But the quote points into a similar direction as this paper’s model: From
the World Bank’s perspective, Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s investment into
public housing had a strategic component. – The following two short sections
give a brief overview over similarities between the model on the one hand and
the two city states on the other hand.
4.1 Hong Kong
Over the last three decades or so, Hong Kong, in per capita terms, has been
one of the largest recipients of FDI in the world. In ﬁve important ways
does Hong Kong resemble the model economy. First, Hong Kong is close
to some of the most populous, and poorer, areas in mainland China. Any
further increase in income must trigger further (illegal) immigration. Hong
Kong indeed is a city open to (illegal) immigration. Second, up to 1999
land ownership in Hong Kong was very simple, as documented by Ho (1992):
All land was owned by the British Crown, and all rent accrued to the Hong
Kong government. In Hong Kong, more than anywhere else, local government
should represent the interests of the landlords.
Third, a large share of Hong Kong households were (and are) public housing
tenants. Following the Hong Kong Housing Authority (1984), in 1984, for
instance, 45% of the Hong Kong population were living in public housing.
But fourth, becoming public housing tenant is more diﬃcult for immigrants
than for natives. According to the Hong Kong Housing Authority (1998, p.
26), in 1998 ”the average waiting time for a public rental ﬂat is six and a half
years”. But, depending on the speciﬁc public housing program, to become
eligible for public housing households not just simply needed to wait. Also,
households had to have been Hong Kong residents for at least 7, if not 10,
years. Hence, there is a residence requirement that resembles the model’s
restriction of public housing to native residents.
The political cost of outright denial of a cash transfer to immigrants from
China must be prohibitive: Immigrants speak the same language, have the
same ethnic background, may even be related to natives, etc. In contrast,
the political cost of denying immigrants immediate access to public housing
must be much lower, given that public housing not just discriminates against
immigrants but against natives still on the waiting list, too.
Fifth, ﬁnally, once households move into public housing, they enjoy amazingly
20strong property rights. (These, to be sure, are currently under pressure, see
Hong Kong Housing Authority (1998).) In the past, tenants who beneﬁtted
from rising wages did not have to leave public housing: ”... having become
tenants, people can continue to work hard, prosper and be sure that they
will be allowed to remain in public housing”. Moreover, ... ”one child of a
tenant ... [could] succeed the tenancy under certain circumstances” (Hong
Kong Housing Authority 1984, p. 11, and Wong/Liu (1988)).
4.2 Singapore
Singapore, too, has been one of the largest per capita recipients of FDI over
the last three decades. We run through the apparent similarities between
Singapore’s economy and the model. First, Singapore must have been at-
tractive to migrants from its immediate, and less rich, neighbors, Malaysia
and Indonesia. Singapore should be classiﬁed as a small open city, too. Sec-
ond, according to Tremewan (1998), ”approximately 75 per cent of the land
is under some form of government ownership and government has the power
to acquire the remainder compulsorily” (p. 77). Third, also according to
Tremewan (1998), over 86 percent of Singaporeans are public housing ten-
ants. Moreover, and fourth, ”Foreign workers on work permits are excluded
from access to public housing except in the minority of ... cases where em-
ployers rent ﬂats on their behalf for limited periods ... Consumption of public
housing and the purchase of ﬂats is restricted to citizens and permanent res-
idents...”(p. 91).17
5. Conclusions
The paper’s model suggests that more public housing inspires more inward
foreign direct investment. More precisely, if natives are public housing ten-
ants, inward FDI becomes more likely.
We treat FDI as any other reform. There are households who lose from FDI
and there are households who gain from FDI. To win support from those who
lose, a compensation scheme may have to be oﬀered. In principle, compensa-
tion could be in cash or in-kind. We argue that public housing has two crucial
17Weder/Brunetti (2000) provide a somewhat diﬀerent explanation of Hong Kong’s and
Singapore’s successes. In their view, these city states had ”an exceptionally good institu-
tional framework for doing business”. Seen from this paper’s perspective, the quality of
the framework for doing business could have been high because public housing permitted a
large fraction of natives to beneﬁt from the FDI driven boom. These households would not
have participated in ”social unrest”, thereby producing Weder/Brunetti’s ”good framework
for doing business”.
21advantages over an equivalent cash transfer. First, due to restrictions on lo-
cal government’s information and autonomy, access to the cash transfer has
to be extended to non-residents while access to public housing does not have
to be extended. Public housing permits subtle discrimination against non-
residents. Next, public housing is much like a land reform: Public housing
transfers part of the property rights of housing ownership to public housing
tenants. Tenants can beneﬁt from an FDI induced wage rise without fear of
suﬀering from the wage rise-induced rent rise. This beneﬁt, in fact, increases
as the urban rent increases.
Now, if public housing appeases losers from FDI, local government may be
tempted to invest into public housing in order to make FDI more palatable.
So the paper’s model also suggests that public housing itself is endogenous.
We ﬁnd that local government will be inclined to invest into public housing if
the probability of a foreign investor applying is large, if the potential beneﬁts
from FDI are large, if the share of potential losers from FDI is small (though
still powerful), and if public housing is not too costly.
We emphasize that local government may choose to invest into public housing
even though landlords are not altruistic, even though public housing oﬀers
no immediate ﬁrst period beneﬁt, and even though public housing is costly
in two ways. First, public housing is ineﬃcient in the sense that private
sector renters would be prepared to pay less for public housing than what
it costs to provide public housing. And second, not just native losers from
FDI get to beneﬁt from public housing. Natives unaﬀected by FDI – because
indistinguishable from native losers – get to beneﬁt from public housing, too.
Oﬀering public housing to natives is a strategic move but only if natives
believe that public housing rent will not rise with market rent, and that
public housing tenants do not get evicted as their nominal income rises. So
we have implicitly assumed that protection via public housing is credible.
Otherwise, however, this paper’s emphasis is not on lack of credibility of
compensation (as in, say, Dixit/Londregan (1995)), nor on lack of certainty
(as in Rodrik/Fernandez (1991)), but on lack of feasibility. In the small
open city, compensation via cash transfers simply is not feasible – while
compensation via public housing is.
We conclude by pointing to one important similarity between this paper and
Alesina/Rodrik (1994), as well as to one important diﬀerence. In Alesina/
Rodrik (1994), it is equality in a country’s land ownership and in other
productive resources that encourages subsequent country growth. Follow-
ing Alesina/Rodrik, ”distributive struggles harmful to growth are more likely
22to take place when resources are distributed unevenly” (p. 467). This idea,
of course, is at the heart of this paper, too. If there is no public housing,
i.e., if renter-households do not beneﬁt at all from FDI, they will (and in
this paper’s model: can) always block FDI. But we also point to the cen-
tral diﬀerence between Alesina/Rodrik (1994) and this paper – besides the
fact that Alesina/Rodrik is on countries, while this paper is on cities. In
Alesina/Rodrik, ownership of productive resources ”is predetermined and re-
mains constant” (p. 485). In this paper, in contrast, property rights are
subject to change. The more harmful the distributional struggles ahead ap-
pear, the more attractive landlord run local government will ﬁnd voluntarily
sharing housing ownership via public housing.
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